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Abstract
The article is devoted to the characteristics of Theresa May minority government and 
its impact on foreign policy. The author concentrated on the political situation in Great 
Britain in the context of Brexit. Some interesting aspects have been chosen to illustrate 
the problem of minority government existence in Great Britain. Author explains various 
factors that influenced the foreign policy and negotiations with EU of the government 
cabinets without a sufficient majority in the parliament. The main thesis is that minori-
ty governments is not able to lead a successful foreign policy in long term and usually 
fails to be effective in this sphere and Brexit process is a visible example of such situation.
Streszczenie
Rząd mniejszościowy Teresy May i przypadek Brexitu
Artykuł poświęcony jest cechom rządu mniejszościowego Premier Teresy May i jego wpły-
wowi na politykę zagraniczną. Autor skoncentrował się na sytuacji politycznej w Wielkiej 
Brytanii w kontekście Brexitu. Wybrano kilka interesujących aspektów ilustrujących 
1 ORCID ID: 0000-0003-1674-6600, PhD, Institute of Political Sciences, Faculty of 
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problem istnienia rządu mniejszościowego w Wielkiej Brytanii. Autor wyjaśnia różne 
czynniki, które wpłynęły na politykę zagraniczną i negocjacje z UE gabinetów rządowych 
bez wystarczającej większości w parlamencie. Główną tezą jest to, że rządy mniejszości 
nie są w stanie prowadzić długofalowej skutecznej polityki zagranicznej i zazwyczaj nie 
są skuteczne w tej dziedzinie, a proces Brexit jest widocznym przykładem takiej sytuacji.
*
I.
The Brexit as a political and judicial process has been started and the Great 
Britain and the European Union is facing that issue now. In the literature 
there are not many articles devoted to the problem of leaving European Un-
ion by a former member state and the process we observe can reveal lots of 
judicial and political aspects. One of the most interesting is the position of 
the negotiating government and its impact on the policy it leads. The funda-
mental question in the context of Brexit is whether the position of minority 
government can influence the whole complicated process of leaving the EU.
The main aim of the presented article is to analyze Theresa May minority 
government and its impact on foreign policy. There is also explained a very 
complicated political situation in Great Britain in the context of Brexit. Some 
interesting aspects have been chosen to illustrate the problem of minority 
government existence in Great Britain, as well as various factors that influ-
enced the foreign policy and negotiations with EU of the government cabi-
nets without a sufficient majority in the parliament. The main thesis is that 
minority governments is not able to lead a successful foreign policy in long 
term and usually fails to be effective in this sphere and Brexit process is a vis-
ible example of such situation.
The formation of minority government in the Westminster political sys-
tem like in Great Britain is not a typical situation. It always is treated by ex-
perts and citizens as an extraordinary situation. If somebody wants to un-
derstand such abnormal situation, he must at the beginning start analyzing 
elections. So, firstly, it is important to realize that voters in a general elec-
tion are not electing a government. All active voters are electing the House of 
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Commons, out of which a government is formed. It may be that most voters 
will cast their votes on the basis of who they want to be Prime Minister, but 
the truth is they are not electing the Parliamentary Members but representa-
tives for their constituencies. Those representatives will collectively determine 
who will hold the office: that is their job as MPs. If a party wins an overall 
majority of seats in the House of Commons it is axiomatic that the leader of 
that party becomes Prime Minister and is invited by Her Majesty the Queen 
to form an administration. If one of the political parties wins more than 325 
or so seats, the old Prime Minister resigns with an immediate effect and the 
new one is installed in 10 Downing Street by mid-morning the following day2.
Unfortunately, from time to time it is possible that voters decide that there 
will be a hung parliament: i.e. the House of Commons in which no party has 
an overall majority of seats. The constitutional rule in these circumstanc-
es is that the leader who can command the confidence of the House forms 
a government. That confidence can be formally tested only when the House 
meets, but this mechanism is not always working. For example, in 2010 this 
did not take place until 12th day after the general election. Thus, the govern-
ment usually is formed before the House of Commons meets. Government 
formation in these circumstances depends, first, on the parliamentary arith-
metic (how many seats does each party have) and, secondly, on negotiations 
between the parties. Those negotiations are designed to see if some combina-
tion of parties can work together to propose a policy platform that would be 
likely to command a majority in the House. This cooperation can take a va-
riety of forms, from formal coalition (as in 2010–15) via “confidence and sup-
ply agreements” to much more informal suck-it-and-see vote-by-vote deals. 
A confidence and supply agreement is when a minor party agrees to support 
a major party in any motion of confidence and as regards the passing of its 
budget. Under such an arrangement there is no formal agreement on other 
matters of legislation or policy.
According to Adam Tomkins, the incumbent Prime Minister may re-
main in office during the period of negotiations. He is under no duty to re-
main in office: no Prime Minister may be compelled to remain in office, if 
2 A. Tomkins, A Fixed-Term Hung Parliament, 4 May 2015, https://britgovcon.wordpress.
com/2015/05/04/a-fixed-term-hung-parliament (15.12.2018).
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he has concluded that he should properly depart, but likewise, he is under 
no duty to resign as well. Gordon Brown did nothing wrong in not resign-
ing until five days after the 2010 general election: he was perfectly entitled 
to remain in office during that time to see whether he could form an agree-
ment with other parties. Brown resigned as PM when it became clear to him 
that he could not do so and that Cameron was better placed to form an ad-
ministration. On the other hand, an incumbent Prime Minister should not 
seek to cling to office once it has become clear that he is unlikely to be able 
to form an administration that can command the confidence of the House 
of Commons. All three leaders of the major parties acted appropriately in 
2010, once a hung parliament was elected. From the presented observations 
it can be seen that it is not true that the largest party gets to go first; still 
less that it has an automatic right to form a government. It is true that on 
every occasion since 1924 the largest party has (as a matter of fact) gone on 
to form a government, but there is no constitutional rule that this must be 
so. The constitutional rule is that the government must command the con-
fidence of the House of Commons3.
In 2011 there was introduced the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (FTPA)4, 
which has a new impact on political situation in Great Britain. Before the 
FTPA was passed a parliament had been elected for a maximum term (of five 
years) but it was for the Prime Minister to decide within that term when the 
next general election should be called. The Act removes this power from the 
PM. An early general election may occur now, only if one of two things hap-
pens: either the Commons passes a motion stating “that this House has no 
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government” or the Commons passes by a two-
thirds majority a motion “that there shall be an early parliamentary general 
election”5. The second motion is unlikely, unless both Government and Op-
position agree that an early general election is in their parties’ and the pub-
lic interest.
As Tomkins claims, a no-confidence motion requires no-two-thirds ma-
jority of MPs: as in any other parliamentary vote a bare majority of the votes 
3 Ibidem.
4 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/14/pdfs/
ukpga_20110014_en.pdf (15.12.2018).
5 Ibidem, p. 2.
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cast is sufficient. The effect of a no-confidence motion being passed is not that 
there will be an immediate general election. Rather, the Act stipulates that 
there will be a 14-day period for the parties (both governing and opposing) to 
seek to form a new administration that can command the confidence of the 
House. Only if no such administration is formed within this time, will there 
then be a dissolution and a new election. The FTPA breaks two matters that 
had previously been linked: confidence and supply, and resignation and dis-
solution. It had formerly been thought that was a government to be defeated 
on its Queen’s Speech (i.e. the outline of its legislative programme, presented 
to Parliament at the beginning of each session) or on its budget, such a defeat 
would amount to a loss of confidence and would lead to the government’s res-
ignation and to a general election. Under the FTPA this is no longer possible. 
It is clear under the Act that only a motion using the words “this House has 
no confidence in her Majesty’s Government” is a vote of confidence. No oth-
er vote, no matter how important, is a vote of confidence, unless it includes 
these words. Thus, was a government to lose a vote on its Queen’s Speech, or 
was a government to fail to get its budget through, this would not by itself 
mean that the House had lost confidence in the government6.
II.
During last several years, at regular intervals political polls have predicted 
that the occurrence of hung parliament in the Great Britain is a highly possi-
ble. Since the autumn of 2006, a hung parliament has been regularly predict-
ed every few months in the polls. The likelihood of a hung parliament has in-
creased for two reasons – firstly, because of the growth of third parties and 
secondly, because of the changes in the way that the electoral system translates 
popular votes into seats in the Commons7. A ‘hung Parliament’, sometimes 
6 A. Tomkins, op.cit.
7 R. Radek, Hung Parliament and Minority Government Formation in Westminster Par-
liamentary System (selected aspects), “Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego” 2015, No. 6, p. 177; 
D. Butler, Hung Parliaments: Context and Background, [in:] No Overall Control? The Impact of 
a ‘Hung Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski, Hansard Society 2008, 
pp. 8–9.
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also called as ‘balanced Parliament’ or ‘Not Over all Control’ (NOC), caus-
es four likely outcomes. These have been set out by Paul Norton as follows8:
8 P. Norton, The Perils of a Hung Parliament, [in:] No Overall Control? The Impact of a ‘Hung 
Parliament’ on British Politics, eds. A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski, Hansard Society 2008, p. 109.























Source: Own work based on UK Election Statistics at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk; 
https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/current-state-of-the-parties (10.10.2020).
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 – a minority government;
 – a coalition;
 – a failure to produce a government at all;
 – two or more of these things during the lifetime of a parliament.
Although hung parliaments are common in other parliamentary democra-
cies, they are relatively rare in the Westminster Parliament, in which the First 
Past the Post electoral system usually rewards the party with the most votes 
with a majority of seats. In fact, Westminster has experienced a hung parlia-
ment in 2017, and there were only six others in the 20th century, following 
the general elections of January 1910, December 1910, December 1923, May 
1929, February 1974, and May 2010. There were also two instances in which 
the government lost its majority in the Commons between general elections: 
in April 1977 and February 1997. These situations of no overall control result-
ed from parties losing seats over the course of a Parliament, through by-elec-
tions and defections.
III.
On 30 June 2016, Theresa May, a British politician, announced her candi-
dacy for the leadership of the Conservative Party to replace Prime Minis-
ter David Cameron, who resigned, following the outcome of the Europe-
an Union membership referendum in which 52% of voters voted in favor of 
leaving the EU. Theresa May emphasized the need for unity within the par-
ty regardless of positions on leaving the EU, saying she could bring “strong 
leadership” and a “positive vision” for the country’s future. Despite having 
backed a vote to remain in the EU, she insisted that there would be no sec-
ond referendum, saying: “The campaign was fought… and the public gave 
their verdict. There must be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no at-
tempts to rejoin it through the back door… Brexit means Brexit”. An opin-
ion poll that day found 47% of people choosing Theresa May as their pre-
ferred candidate to be prime minister9.
9 H. Carr, Theresa May Is Britons’ Favorite for PM – Poll, Sky News, https://web.archive.
org/web/20160702045052/http://news.sky.com/story/1719848/theresa-may-is-britons-
favorite-for-pm-poll (10.10.2020).
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On 13 July 2016, two days after becoming the Leader of the Conservative 
Party, Theresa May was appointed for prime minister by Queen Elizabeth II, 
becoming the second female British prime minister after Margaret Thatcher10.
On 20 July 2016, May attended her first Prime Minister’s Questions since 
taking office, and made her first overseas trip as prime minister afterwards, 
visiting Berlin for talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. During the 
visit, Theresa May said that she would not trigger the Art. 50 of the Trea-
ty of Lisbon – the process for withdrawing from the European Union – be-
fore 2017, suggesting it would take time for the UK to negotiate a “sensi-
ble and orderly departure” from the EU. However, although Angela Merkel 
said it was right for the UK to “take a moment” before beginning the pro-
cess, she urged May to provide more clarity on a timetable for negotiations. 
Shortly before travelling to Berlin, Theresa May had also announced that 
in the wake of the referendum, the UK would relinquish the presidency of 
the Council of the European Union, which passes between member states 
every six months on a rotation basis, and that the UK had been scheduled 
to hold in the second half of 201711.
On 18 April 2017, Theresa May announced that she would call a parliamen-
tary vote to hold an early general election on 8 June 2017 in order to guaran-
tee certainty and security for years ahead predicting to strengthen the posi-
tion of the Conservatists12. The election was the first snap election held under 
the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 after MPs gave May the two-thirds su-
per-majority required. Unveiling the Conservative manifesto in Halifax on 
18 May 2017, Theresa May promised a new programme for Britain with lots 
of ambitious aims in it13. On Brexit it committed to leaving the single mar-
10 The Queen received in audience The Right Honorable Theresa May, Official site of the Royal 
Family, 13 June 2016, https://www.royal.uk/queen-received-audience-right-honorable-the-
resa-may (10.10.2020).
11 Brexit: Theresa May says talks won’t start in 2016, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-politics-36841066 (10.10.2020); Angela Merkel backs Theresa May’s plan not to trigger 
Brexit this year, The Guardian, 20 July 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
jul/20/angela-merkel-backs-theresa-mays-plan-not-to-trigger-brexit-this-year (10.10.2020).
12 Theresa May to seek general election on 8 June, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-politics-39629603 (10.10.2020).
13 May signals break with Thatcherism in manifesto for ‘country and community’, The Guard-
ian, 18 May 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/may/18/theresa-may-launch-
397Robert Radek • Minority Government of Theresa May and the Case of Brexit
ket and customs union while seeking a “deep and special partnership” and 
promised a vote in parliament on the final agreement.
However, the Great Britain was supposed to create a new political clarity 
after the elections 2017 and to begin formal negotiations to leave the Euro-
pean Union, the situation became more complicated. Instead, the experts14 
started to predict an unstable government at a hung Parliament and a deeply 
damaged Prime Minister Theresa May, whose authority and credibility frac-
tured by her failure to maintain her Conservative Party’s majority in Par-
liament. There were even demands that she should resign, but Theresa May 
rejected them and said she would cling to power by forming a minority gov-
ernment with the support of the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ire-
land (DUP) and she did it to stabilize the political situation. Because the Con-
servatives won the most seats and the most votes, Theresa May got the first 
chance to form a new government, despite winning only 318 seats, 12 fewer 
than in 2015, and short of a formal majority of 326 in the 650-seat House of 
Commons. The Democratic Unionists won 10. For European Union leaders, 
who were expecting her to emerge with a reinforced majority, the uncertain-
ty was unwelcome, especially as they tried to prioritize issues such as climate 
change and their relationship with an unpredictable and unfriendly President 
Trump. There was also resentment that, once again, the British had compli-
cated things out of political hubris and partisan self-interest15.
IV.
On 4 December 2018, on a motion passed by MPs by 311 to 293 votes16, the 
May Government was found in contempt of Parliament for the first in histo-
es-conservative-manifesto-for-community-and-country (10.10.2020).
14 How a minority government does (not) work, The Economist, 9 June 2017, https://
www.economist.com/speakers-corner/2017/06/09/how-a-minority-government-does-not-work 
(14.04.2020).
15 S. Erlanger, K. Bennhold, S. Castle, The British Election That Somehow Made Brexit 
Even Harder, New York Times, 9 June 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/
europe/uk-theresa-may-minority-government.html (15.12.2018).
16 B. Kentish, Theresa May government found in contempt of parliament over failure to publish 
full Brexit legal advice, The Independent, 4 December 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/
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ry. The vote was triggered by the government failing to lay before Parliament 
any legal advice on the proposed withdrawal agreement on the terms of the 
UK’s departure from the European Union, after a humble address for a re-
turn was unanimously agreed to by the House of Commons on 13 November 
2018. The government then agreed to publish the full legal advice for Brexit 
that was given to the Prime Minister by the Attorney General during nego-
tiations with the European Union.
In the following days, exactly on 12 December 2018, Theresa May’s gov-
ernment faced a vote of no confidence in her leadership over opposition to her 
negotiated Brexit deal from the Conservative Party, after the number of Con-
servative MPs exceeded the 48 no-confidence letter, threshold that the 1922 
Committee Chairman, Sir Graham Brady required one to be held. May won 
the vote with 200 Conservative MPs voting for her, compared to 117 voting 
against. As a part of her speech to the Parliamentary Conservative Party be-
fore the no-confidence vote was opened, it was reported that May conceded 
that she would step down as prime minister after delivering Brexit and would 
not lead the Conservative Party into the next General Election in exchange 
for Conservative MPs voting to have confidence in her leadership so that she 
would be able to keep the party, Parliament and the UK stable during the fi-
nal stages of Brexit. May later confirmed this after meeting EU leaders, in-
cluding Jean-Claude Juncker in Brussels17.
Such internal problems of government policy were a great opportunity for 
the Leader of the Opposition and Labor Party Leader, Jeremy Corbyn, who 
tabled on 17 December 2018 a motion of no confidence in May’s prime min-
istership, citing May’s refusal to set the date for the meaningful vote on her 
Brexit deal before Christmas, and instead pushing it back to mid-January. The 
following day, the government refused to allow time for the motion to be de-
bated. John Bercow, Speaker of the House of Commons, confirmed that they 
news/uk/politics/contempt-parliament-vote-theresa-may-brexit-legal-advice-government-geof-
frey-cox-a8667091.html (15.04.2019); ‘Please back my deal’: Prime minister’s plea to Commons 
after three government defeats, Sky News, https://news.sky.com/story/mps-gear-up-for-mara-
thon-five-day-brexit-deal-debate-11571280 (19.09.2019).
17 J. Watts, L. Buchan, Theresa May wins critical vote of confidence from Conservative MPs, 
thwarting Brexiteer rebels, The Independent, 12 December 2018, https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-wins-vote-confidence-conservative-leadership-brex-
it-deal-eu-vote-a8679986.html (25.01.2020).
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were under no obligation to do so. Following the defeat of May’s Brexit deal 
on 15 January 2019 by a margin of 230 votes (202 in favor and 432 opposed18), 
Corbyn tabled a motion of no confidence in the Government, to be voted on 
by parliament the following evening. The motion was defeated by 325 votes 
to 306, so with the majority of 1919.
A similar situation was on 14 February 2019, when Theresa May suffered 
another House of Commons defeat after MPs voted by 303 to 258 – a major-
ity of 45 – against a motion endorsing the government’s Brexit negotiating 
strategy. Problems of May’s minority goverment were continued the following 
months. For example, on March 12, May was again defeated in the House of 
Commons by 149 votes (242 in favor and 391 against) on her latest deal after 
she secured last-minute concessions from the EU. Almost three weeks later, 
on March 29, Theresa May was again defeated by 58 votes in the Commons 
(286 in favor and 344 against)20.
The context of the last voting was linked with the Brexit negotiations. Two 
days before the House of Commons voting, on 27 March 2019, at the meet-
ing of the 1922 Committee, Theresa May confirmed that she will “not lead 
the UK in the next stage of Brexit negotiations”, meaning she was expected 
to resign after the third meaningful vote, if it had passed successfully. How-
ever, no date was stated, and her reported wording was ambiguous and thus 
carried no binding force. After defeating the third meaningful vote on March 
18 It was the largest majority against a United Kingdom government in history.
19 Labor makes no-confidence move against PM, BBC News, 17 December 2018, https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46599895 (15.08.2019); Brexit: Cabinet ‘rumps up’ no-deal 
planning, BBC News, 18 December 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46600850 
(15.08.2019); A. Sparrow, K. Rawlinson, K. Lyons, Jeremy Corbyn tables no-confidence motion 
after May defeat – as it happened, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
live/2019/jan/15/brexit-vote-parliament-latest-news-may-corbyn-gove-tells-tories-they-can-
improve-outcome-if-mays-deal-passed-politics-live (20.02.2019); F. Krauze-Jackson, May 
Loses Brexit Vote in Landslide, Faces Confidence Vote, Bloomberg Politics, 15 January 2019, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019–01-15/may-loses-brexit-vote-in-a-landslide-throwing-
deal-into-disarray (25.01.2019).
20 H. Steward, MPs ignore May’s pleas and defeat her Brexit deal by 149 votes, The Guardian, 
12 March 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/12/mps-ignore-mays-
pleas-and-defeat-her-brexit-deal-by-149-votes (03.04.2019); T. Edgington, What Brexit deal 
did MPS reject?, BBC News, 29 March 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47745831 
(23.04.2019).
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29 Theresa May did not state anything in regards to standing down, so Jere-
my Corbyn stated that if May cannot find an alternative to her deal, “she must 
go, not at an indeterminate date in the future but even now”21.
The political situation in the ruling party and the government itself start-
ed to become more and more complicated. People were witnessing official 
negotiations among party influential politicians, who were more and more 
determined to change the party leader and, in consequence, the prime min-
ister. Finally, Theresa May confirmed that she would resign from leadership 
on June 7, announcing that it was then clear to her that it was in the best in-
terests of the country for a new prime minister to lead effort connected with 
the Brexit. Her resignation to the Queen took place on July 24. This coincided 
with the arrival of Boris Johnson as prime minister, who was elected by the 
Conservative Party membership. By constitutional convention Theresa May 
did not step down until she assured the Queen that Johnson would be able 
to command the confidence of the House of Commons22.
V.
The Brexit revealed in a very spectacular way how difficult is to continue ne-
gotiations with the EU leaders when the position of government is weak. Sec-
ondly, Theresa May was not deeply convinced23 they were doing the right step 
with this political process.
21 Brexit: Theresa May vows to stand down if deal is passed, BBC News, 27 March 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47725529 (22.05.2019); Brexit: MPs reject May’s 
EU withdrawal agreement, BBC News, 30 March 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-poli-
tics-47752017 (22.05.2019).
22 R. Mason, Next Tory leader could face immediate confidence vote, The Guardian, 6 June 
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/06/new-tory-leader-could-avoid-im-
mediate-confidence-vote (20.06.2019); Recap: Theresa May sets departure from No 10, BBC 
News, 24 May 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/live/uk-politics-48394091 (11.06.2019).
23 Theresa May even said: “I think the economic arguments are clear. I think being 
part of a 500-million trading bloc is significant for us. I think, as I was saying to you a little 
earlier, that one of the issues is that a lot of people will invest here in the UK because it is 
the UK in Europe. If we were not in Europe, I think there would be firms and companies 
who would be looking to say, do they need to develop a mainland Europe presence rather 
than a UK presence? So, I  think there are definite benefits for us in economic terms”. 
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It should be stated that the 2015 Referendum Act did not expressly require 
Art. 50 to be invoked, but prior to the referendum, the UK government said 
it would respect the result. When David Cameron resigned following the ref-
erendum, he said that it would be for the incoming prime minister to invoke 
Art. 50. The new prime minister, Theresa May, said she would wait until 2017 
to invoke the article, in order to prepare for the negotiations24. In October 
2016, she said the UK would trigger Art. 50 in March 2017, and in December 
she gained the support of MP’s for her timetable25.
In January 2017, the UK Supreme Court ruled in the Miller case26 that gov-
ernment could only invoke Art. 50 if authorized by an act of parliament would 
do so. The government subsequently introduced a bill for that purpose, and it 
was passed into law on 16 March 2017 as the European Union (Notification 
of Withdrawal) Act 2017. On 29 March 2017, Theresa May triggered Art. 50 
when Tim Barrow, the UK’s ambassador to the EU, delivered the invocation 
N. Hopkins, R. Mason, Exclusive: what Theresa May really thinks about Brexit shown in 
leaked recording , “The Guardian”, 26 October 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
politics/2016/oct/25/exclusive-leaked-recording-shows-what-theresa-may-really-thinks-
about-brexit (20.03.2020).
24 A. Renwick, What happens if we vote for Brexit?, The Constitution Unit, 19 January 2016, 
https://constitution-unit.com/2016/01/19/what-happens-if-we-vote-for-brexit (12.12.2019); 
C. Cooper, David Cameron rules out possibility of second EU referendum despite online petition, 
The Independent, 27 June 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brex-
it-what-is-eu-referendum-petition-david-cameron-a7105596.html (20.11.2019); R. Mason, 
P. Oltermann, Angela Merkel backs Theresa May’s plan not to trigger Brexit this year, The Guardian, 
20 July 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/20/angela-merkel-backs-the-
resa-mays-plan-not-to-trigger-brexit-this-year (20.11.2019).
25 A. Spence, Theresa May to begin Brexit process by end of March, Politico, 2 October 
2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-to-begin-brexit-process-by-end-of-march 
(10.03.2019); C. Cooper, British MPs back Theresa May’s Brexit timetable, Politico, 9 Decem-
ber 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/british-mps-back-theresa-mays-brexit-timetable 
(10.03.2019).
26 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union is a United Kingdom 
constitutional law case decided by the United Kingdom Supreme Court on 24 January 2017, 
which ruled that the UK Government (the executive) may not initiate withdrawal from the 
European Union by formal notification to the Council of the European Union as prescribed by 
the Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union without the Act of the UK Parliament permitting 
the government to do so, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016–0196-judg-
ment.pdf (20.10.2019).
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letter to European Council President Donald Tusk. This made 29 March 2019 
the expected date that the UK would leave EU.
In December 2018, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the 
UK could unilaterally revoke its notification of withdrawal, as long as it 
was still a member and had not agreed a withdrawal agreement. The de-
cision to do so should be “unequivocal and unconditional” and “follow 
a democratic process”. If the UK revoked their notification, they would 
remain a member of the EU under their current membership terms. The 
case was launched by Scottish politicians, and referred to the ECJ by the 
Scottish Court of Session27.
Prior to the negotiations, Theresa May said that the UK government would 
not seek permanent single market membership, would end ECJ jurisdiction, 
seek a new trade agreement, end free movement of people, and maintain the 
Common Travel Area with Ireland. The EU adopted its negotiating direc-
tives in May, and appointed Michael Barnier as Chief Negotiator28. Negoti-
ations commenced on 19 June 2017. Negotiating groups were established for 
three topics: the rights of EU citizens living in Britain and vice versa; Brit-
ain’s outstanding financial obligations to the EU; and the border between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In December 2017, a partial 
agreement was reached. It ensured that there would be no hard border in 
Ireland, the rights of UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK will 
be protected, and estimated the financial settlement to be £35–39 billion. 
Prime Minister May stressed that nothing was agreed until everything was 
agreed. Following this partial agreement, EU leaders agreed to move on to 
27 R. Taylor, A. Wilson, Revoking Article 50 after the ECJ’s ruling, University of Aberdeen 
School of Law, 11 December 2018, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/revoking-article-50-after-the-ec-
js-ruling (20.11.2019); Brexit ruling: UK can cancel decision, EU court says, BBC News, 10 
December 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-46481643 
(20.11.2019).
28 Prime Minister Theresa May set out the Plan for Britain, including the 12 priorities that 
the UK government will use to negotiate Brexit, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech (20.11.2019); Compare 
with: Directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-negotiation-xt21016-ad01re02en17.
pdf (20.11.2019).
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the second phase in the negotiations: discussion of the future relationship, 
a transition period and a possible trade deal29.
In March 2018, a 21-month transition period and the terms for it were 
provisionally agreed. Two months later, Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar said 
that there had been little progress on the Irish border question – on which 
the EU proposed a backstop, to come into effect if no overall trade deal had 
been reached by the end of the transition period – and that it was unlikely 
that there would be a solution before October 2018, when the whole deal was 
to be agreed. In July 2018, the UK government published the Chequers plan30, 
its aims for the future relationship to be determined in the negotiations. The 
plan sought to keep the UK access to the single market for goods, but not nec-
essarily for services, while allowing for an independent trade policy.
After the attempt to accept the plan of Brexit in the British Parliament and 
its poor results, that was described earlier, Theresa May wrote in March 2019 
a letter to European Council President Tusk requesting to postpone Brex-
it until 30 June 2019. After the European Council summit meeting in Brus-
sels, EU leaders rejected this date and offered instead a choice of two alterna-
tives. There were several options agreed between the UK government and the 
European Council. The first alternative was that if MPs rejected May’s deal, 
Brexit would be due to occur by 12 April 2019, with, or without, a deal – or 
alternatively another extension be asked for and a commitment to partici-
pate in the 2019 European Parliament elections given. The second alterna-
29 A. Land, V. Miller, Brexit: the talks begin, Briefing Paper No. 8017, House of Commons 
Library, 12 July 2017, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8017/CBP-
8017.pdf (20.11.2019); D. Staunton, P. Smyth, F. Kelly, P. Leahy, W. Clarke, Brexit breakthrough: 
Taoiseach says ‘politically bullet-proof ’ deal rules out hard border, The Irish Times, 8 December 
2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/brexit-breakthrough-taoiseach-says-po-
litically-bullet-proof-deal-rules-out-hard-border-1.3320030 (20.11.2019); C. Hope, Theresa 
May to tell Ireland ‘nothing is agreed ’ on terms of Brexit as row over deal intensifies, 
The Telegraph, 11 December 2017, https://w w w.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/11/
theresa-may-tel l-ireland-nothing-agreed-terms-brex it-row-deal (20.11.2019).
30 The Chequers plan, officially known as The future relationship between the United Kingdom 
and the European Union is a UK Government white paper concerning Brexit, published on 12 
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tive was that if MPs approved May’s deal, Brexit would be due to occur on 22 
May 2019. The later date was the day before the start of European Parliament 
elections. During 10 April 2019 late-night talks in Brussels, a further exten-
sion was planned, to 31 October 2019. However, Theresa May had again re-
quested an extension only until 30 June. Under the terms of this new exten-
sion, if the Withdrawal Agreement was to be passed before October, Brexit 
would occur on the first day of the subsequent month. The UK would then be 
obligated to hold European Parliament elections in May, or leave the EU on 
1 June without a deal31. Till the time when Theresa May was holding a po-
sition of Prime Minister, the EU adopted a stance of refusing to renegotiate 
the Withdrawal Agreement.
Critics of hung parliaments in general argue that it will inherently result 
in weak and unstable government with ministers lacking the power and au-
thority to deal with pressing economic, social and national security challeng-
es. The case of Brexit “soap opera” confirms such an opinion. Theresa May’s 
minority government was not effective in this field.
In conclusion minority governments which may be the consequence of 
hung parliament in Westminster system may have problems with extraor-
dinary foreign issues, and Brexit confirmed such a problem. However, Brit-
ain has experienced several times hung parliaments out of which the cabi-
net of Theresa May was the first with serious changes in the political system.
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